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India is currently going through the most significant economic slowdown it has experienced in at 
least the past 20 years. Prior economic slowdowns, such as the crisis of 1991, were driven by 
macroeconomic challenges. A successful series of reforms between 1991 and 2004 set the Indian 
economy on a basis of sound fundamentals, paving the way for rapid growth up to this point. But 
not all of the necessary reforms were put in place, and as a result, India’s political and economic 
institutions have been unable to keep pace with the country’s rapid growth. Inefficiencies and 
policy distortions have grown more severe, and a recent series of economic shocks and policy 
missteps have threatened to highlight the cracks in India’s economic foundations and throw the 
country off its growth trajectory entirely – made abundantly clear by the difficulties faced by the 
export and manufacturing sectors. To return to a path of rapid, inclusive, and sustainable growth, 
simple economic stimulus is insufficient. India must return to its unfinished reform agenda, 
introducing policies concerning land acquisition, labor law reform, mobilization of capital and 
ease of doing business which will bring Indian economic governance in line with the realities of a 
rapidly growing power operating within a highly globalized world. If India does not summon the 
political will to implement these reforms, then it will very likely witness marginalization in global 
supply chains, continued unemployment and economic stagnation, and ultimately the sacrifice of 
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India’s Economic Trajectory from 1991 to 2014 
 
Roots of the 1991 Economic Crisis 
 
India experienced high and growing fiscal deficits over the course of the 1980s, as successive 
governments escalated programs at both the central and state levels which ramped up 
expenditures without significantly and concurrently increasing fiscal revenues. Government 
expenditures grew more rapidly than both GDP and revenue growth. The Government 
Expenditure to GDP ratio, which sat at 24.5% in 1981-82, had risen to 30.5% by 1986-87, before 
remaining roughly flat for the rest of the decade as inflation concerns, driven by excessive 
central bank borrowing, limited the amount the government could continue to borrow. Subsidies, 
managed at the state level rose even faster than expenditures, rising as a proportion of the 
expanding pie of total expenditure from 8.5% to 10.2% over the course of the decade. 
 
Absent additional revenue, the expansionary borrowing the government undertook to finance this 
high level of expenditure drove up government deficits at both the central and state levels. 
During the 1980s, the central government deficit rose from 6.1% GDP to 8.4% GDP, and the 
combined deficit rose from 9.0% GDP to 12.7% GDP. To help make payments to the country’s 
foreign and domestic creditors in this deficit environment, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) 
began monetizing the deficit by increasing the money supply. This solved payment problems in 
the short term, but the high levels of inflation this policy created worsened India’s 
macroeconomic position moving forward. 
 
Over the course of the 1980s, India faced an increasingly severe balance of payments crisis. High 
inflation, peaking at 17% in August, had resulted from high levels of internal borrowing which 
had driven the overall debt from 35% GDP to 53% GDP in just ten years. This increased debt 
load caused net interest payments to rise from 2% of GDP and 10% of central government 
expenditure to 4% GDP and 20% central government expenditure over the same period. RBI’s 
attempts to monetize this debt drove inflation and a weakening of the currency which reduced 
the price of exports relative to imports. As a result, the current account deficit increased from an 
annual average of 1.3% GDP over the first half of the 1980s to 2.2% GDP over the second half 
of the decade.  
 
Additionally, India’s foreign denominated debt had experienced a secular increase from 12% of 
GDP to 23% of GDP over the course of the decade as the government sought out external means 
to finance its growing deficit. This commercial borrowing helped temporarily stave off pressure 
to meet debt payments, but made the overall external indebtedness problem more severe, 
particularly as the currency weakened. Decades of protectionist policies which had left Indian 
manufacturing significantly behind the curve relative to global competitors limited policy efforts 
to boost competitiveness, which could have strengthened the currency and relieved the pressure 
of these external debt payments without contributing further to inflation. Private investment 
which could boost domestic export competitiveness was also unlikely to materialized, given the 
crowding-out effect of an expansionary fiscal policy which drove high inflation and high interest 
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rates by attempting to prioritize maintaining unsustainable levels of consumption over fiscal 
consolidation. 
 
By 1991, India’s macroeconomic position had reached crisis mode. Imports had bottomed out, 
shrinking at an annual rate of 16%, and were becoming ever more expensive. Thanks both to the 
weakening Rupee and the oil shock resulting from the disruption of the First Gulf War, the 
petroleum importing country’s oil bill doubled to 6 billion USD during the fiscal year ending in 
March 1991. Liquidity crises had forced the government to resort to selling gold, using special 
IMF facilities, and making emergency bilateral agreements with Germany and Japan in order to 
meet increasingly difficult and urgent external payment obligations. A combination of long-
accumulating macroeconomic factors, ranging from direct policy missteps such as the excessive 
fiscal deficit and use of inflation as a budgetary safety valve, in combination with more structural 
factors such as  poor export competitiveness and failure to encourage public and private 
investment, had brought the Indian economy to the precipice, arguably its most precarious point 
since independence itself. The vast, multiparty democracy quickly reached a broad consensus 
that major, sweeping reforms were necessary to stop the bleeding, let alone set the country back 
on a path of growth. 
 
First Wave of Reforms 
 
Having narrowly avoided default, the Indian National Congress government under Narasimha 
Rao embarked upon a period of significant opening and liberal reform. The Congress program 
followed the lines of the Structural Adjustment Programs which had grown common at this time 
and continue to undergo criticism for a perceived excessive focus on privatization and the 
hollowing out of government services. It was not the first time India had introduced 
liberalization reforms – limited efforts took place during the 1980s as the limits of the country’s 
public sector-driven, Import Substitution Industrialization program became clear, although only 
the payments crisis set the country permanently on the track to switching away from this model. 
However, the policy and economic reforms, particularly in the industrial, trade, and financial 
sectors, which were introduced during the Rao government were far more ambitious and reached 
a far greater depth. This first wave of reforms did not take place during a strong period of 
growth, but they did lay the foundations for future growth by rebuilding the country’s 
macroeconomic stability and starting dismantle long-standing barriers to international 
competitiveness. 
 
First and foremost, the fiscal deficit, which had caused economic policymakers to undergo the 
contortions which ultimately forced a balance of payments crisis, was reduced. The deficit 
declined from 8.3% in 1990-91 to 5.5% in 1995-96, thanks to cuts in subsidies and defense 
expenditures. The revenue deficit remained reasonably high, at 3.4% of GDP in 1995, and 
continued to be a source of inflationary pressure, excessive public debt interest payments, and 
crowding-out of private investment. State fiscal deficits, driven by hidden subsidies from the 
chronic underpricing of utilities and public services, also remained stubbornly high at 3% GDP. 
But in contrast with earlier, neither the states nor the central government had to resort to 
emergency measures to remain solvent. In addition, the ad-hoc financing of the debt through 
monetary policy, which had risen as high as 2.1% of GDP in 1991-92, came to an end. This did 
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raise the cost of borrowing, but it increased RBI’s control over monetary policy and 
independence from fiscal policy. Open-market operations, one of RBI’s chief tools for exercising 
monetary policy, were made more efficient by allowing government securities to be sold publicly 
at market rates, which had the added benefit of strengthening an unprofitable banking sector 
which had inhibited domestic savings and investment. Through these efforts, external debt fell 
from 41% of total debt in 1991-92 to 36% in 1993-94 alone, and the debt service ratio fell from 
30.3% to 24.8%, reducing the burden of past borrowing on the budget and contemporary policies 
to encourage future investment and growth. 
 
While limiting expenditures was one half of the fiscal balance equation, increasing revenues was 
the other. Revenues in the past had been limited not by low rates, but by noncompliance and 
failure to collect, so the government took steps to increase rates of compliance. Tax collection 
was exercised in a more regular, standardized fashion, allowing companies to reliably predict 
when taxes would be due and to plan on them as an expense. The government also divested from 
many unprofitable public-sector companies, using the proceeds to help fund deficit reduction. 
Increased revenue collection was successful enough that India was able to reduce income taxes 
and the distortionary corporate tax, leaving businesses with more capital for investment and 
growth while reducing incentives for noncompliance. 
 
Inflation remained high over the first half of the 1990s, due to continuing high fiscal deficits, the 
devaluation of the rupee, a high money supply from excessive acquisition of foreign currency 
reserves, and shortages of several important government-administered commodities for 
consumption. However, these supply bottlenecks for essential commodities were relieved as 
production increased and import licensing requirements were lifted. Further reductions in red 
tape caused FDI proposals to more reliably materialize as actual investment, which both 
moderated inflation by reducing excessive foreign reserve accumulation and directly contributed 
to growth. Results quickly materialized – 15 billion USD in FDI was approved from 1991-95, 
compared to less than one billion USD over the entire preceding decade. 
 
Additional external reforms both encouraged further foreign investment and increased the 
competitiveness of Indian goods on the global market, gradually shrinking the current account 
deficit and mitigating the balance of payments problem. Where the once-prevalent import 
substitution paradigm had severely limited imports of capital goods, intermediary goods and raw 
materials, a new export-oriented trade policy abolished direct restrictions on all imports with the 
exception of final consumption goods. This encouraged industrial technology upgrades, which 
expanded the production capacity and efficiency for India’s export industries. The maximum 
custom duty was also reduced from 250% to 50%, and the average tariffs on capital goods and 
machinery were reduced from 80-85% to 25%. Overall tariffs were reduced and somewhat 
standardized between goods, simplifying an extremely complicated schedule of levies and duties. 
These moves brought Indian tariffs in line with other developing countries, making it 
comparatively more attractive as an investment destination. Ultimately, costs were reduced for 
industry, production bottlenecks were relieved, and competition was encouraged, increasing 
output, quality, and price competitiveness. Other external reforms included permitting gold 
imports, allowing foreign institutional investors to invest in Indian capital markets, and 
establishing the full market-determined convertibility of the Rupee on the current account. This 
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last move, only made possible by a newly stable currency which did not require the sheltering of 
capital controls, boosted both imports and exports by dramatically simplifying foreign 
transactions while encouraging legal remittances. Between all these efforts to reform external 
economy policy, the export-import ratio rose from 65% in 1988-91 to 90% between 1991-94 
while maintaining a current account deficit below 1% GDP. 
 
Competitiveness was not only boosted by reforming external policy, but also by reviewing 
internal policy. For instance, the Narasimha Rao government put an end to licensing 
requirements for firms which wished to modernize or expand their production capacity. This 
policy had been put in place prior to the crisis to avoid the accumulation of what was described 
as “excess market power,” but its real effect had only been to prevent manufacturers operating in 
a global market from making the investments needed to remain competitive and profitable. 
Lifting the production licensing requirement helped encourage these businesses to make their 
investment decisions to meet the needs of the market, rather than a regulatory regime designed 
around an economic paradigm which globalization had made obsolete. Further internal 
competitiveness reforms included the lifting of price controls for noncritical goods not managed 
under government monopolies, further increasing the responsiveness of manufacturers to the 
market, and freer policy around the import of technology. With the increased industrial activity 
which Indian industry witnessed during this period, brought on by these more liberal policies, the 
sector experienced sharp increases in joint ventures, technical collaborations, and other FDI and 
capital inflow. This industrial investment, emphasizing technology upgrades, industrial 
restructuring and export orientation, represented a beneficial step toward long-term industrial 
growth. 
 
In the financial sector, banks had been weakened by excessive liquidity requirements and other 
red tape which had limited profitability and therefore the flexibility necessary to make strategic 
investments with spillover effects on growth. The reforms passed during this period loosened 
these requirements and eliminated the majority of deposit ceiling rates which had prevented the 
commercial arms of banks from raising capital as freely as possible. Financial sector profitability 
was further bolstered by encouraging the development of a money market and a secondary 
market for government debt, both with free, marketized interest rates. 
 
Liberalization in the financial sector was matched by support for ailing banks and new forms of 
oversight to better meet the challenges faced by the rapidly evolving industry. Weak banks were 
recapitalized, profitable banks were given direct access to capital markets both foreign and 
domestic, Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) were provided access to the Indian stock market, 
itself the beneficiary of new trading technology, and the Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI) was established to strengthen stock market regulation. The sector also experienced a 
wave of privatization, as the government divested from some of its least profitable public-sector 
enterprises, including banks, in order to raise funds to reduce the deficit. At this point, the 
government did not fully privatize most of these enterprises, choosing to remain in charge as a 
majority owner and effective manager. This postponed some of the most critical governance 
reforms within the financial sector to a later date, and bureaucratic controls continued to restrict 
the functioning of many of these enterprises. Nevertheless, the influx of new private capital 
encouraged innovative approaches to leasing, mutual funds, and new applications of technology 
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to existing business practices. To meet the regulatory needs of these financial innovations, RBI 
modestly expanded its supervision over commercial banks and Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
(NBFCs) by establishing standard practices for income recognition, loan-loss provisions, capital 
adequacy and account transparency, information which would help prevent banks from shielding 
dangerous liabilities on their balance sheets and avoid the need for the high liquidity 
requirements which had so held back the sector. 
 
While the effort put forth to make India’s macroeconomic fundamentals suitable for long-term 
growth bore fruit, insufficient infrastructure undermined this growth at every turn. Public 
investment was insufficient to meet demand in key sectors such as power, telecommunications, 
petroleum, mining and transportation, particularly as public investment fell over this period as 
part of India’s fiscal retrenchment. Public-sector infrastructure companies remained too 
unprofitable to make investments off their own balance sheets, as the hidden subsidies 
represented by the chronic underpricing, often below cost, of their services deprived them of the 
necessary resources. Governance reform within these PSCs was unlikely as long as they 
remained public and vulnerable to politicization. Additionally, private and foreign investment 
largely failed to fill the breach, thanks in part to unclear policies governing private investment in 
infrastructure.  
 
Overall, however, this was a period of great progress for Indian institutions and the Indian 
economy. Fiscal and monetary policies had been aligned in common purpose to stabilize the 
budget and incentivize investment, while foreign exchange reserves had returned to a level 
robust enough to smooth the impacts of disruptive short-term capital outflow. With an improved 
fiscal position, a more stable balance of payments situation, a stabilized and liberalized exchange 
rate and a newly open set of trade policies, India had announced to the world that it was open for 
business. As long as savings and investment continued to remain at satisfactory levels, India 
would remain well situated for economic growth into the foreseeable future.  
 
Second Wave of Reforms 
 
Over the first decade and a half following the 1991 economic crisis, reforms were put forth by an 
alternating series of governments and political coalitions. Whereas the first wave of reforms had 
been led by the Congress government under Narasimha Rao, the next series of reforms were 
spearheaded by a BJP coalition under the purview of Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Within each of these 
governments, as a broad pattern, parties in power supported economic reforms while opposition 
parties opposed them. Yet reforms generally continued in the same direction even after changes 
in party. This demonstrated that despite day-to-day political gamesmanship, this was an era of 
broad consensus across Indian society regarding the types of economic reforms that were 
necessary. The reforms which had already been put in place had set India on track for roughly a 
6% annual long-term growth rate. But if the full, ambitious slate of expenditure and institutional 
reforms which were envisioned at the time were implemented, then growth could increase to 7% 
or even 8%. This extra growth would itself boost the domestic savings rate and attract foreign 
savings, increasing investment further and paving the way for even more long-term growth. 
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But significant challenges still remained. The fiscal deficit was stuck at 5.5% GDP as of 2000-
01, mainly due to a stubbornly high revenue deficit of 3.4% GDP. Although reductions in 
expenditure, including slashed capital expenditure, reduced central government outlays from 
18.5% GDP to 15.5% GDP during the 1990s, overall government expenditure remained as high 
as 33% GDP when state budgets were taken into account. India’s fiscal deficit as a percentage of 
GDP was good for fourth-worst out of 75 countries listed on the World Economic Forum’s 2001-
02 Global Competitiveness Report (GCR).   
 
The persistently high budget deficit put an effective floor on interest rates, which made 
government debt repayment burdensome and limited private investment. It likewise hurt public 
investment and overall growth by reducing net national savings and investment. High taxes to 
cover these deficits could also imperil growth, and the experience of the balance of payments 
crisis rightly discouraged RBI from attempting to monetize the deficit again (inflation from 
1996-2001, in fact, dropped to its lowest point since the mid-1950s). The task fell to 
policymakers, therefore, to find ways to decrease government expenditures without risking the 
social safety net or the country’s other investments in its long-term well-being. Without such 
fiscal adjustment, India risked another period of high inflation and monetary instability which 
could jeopardize the path of growth. Expenditures could be decreased by selling off failing 
public-sector companies, reducing and targeting central government subsidies, and reducing the 
size of the public administration. But while expenditures were excessive in some areas, public 
investments in core areas of development such as education and health and remained inadequate, 
especially at the state level, to the task of providing for sustainable, broad-based and inclusive 
development. 
 
The low public investment caused by budgetary reforms also left India’s infrastructure, which 
ranked 66th out of 75 on the 2001-02 GCR, inadequate for the demands of the newly growing 
economy. Underinvestment was most obvious in electrical power generation, transport 
infrastructure such as roads and railways, and trade infrastructure such as port facilities. For 
example, newly built public power generation capacity in 2001-02 barely met half of national 
targets. Private investment did not fill the rest of the gap, which signaled a paradox: India’s 
public capital expenditures had been drastically cut to meet budgetary constraints, but new public 
investment would once again be necessary to jumpstart the process of infrastructure construction 
which private investment could then continue. Solving the fiscal knot grew ever more urgent. 
 
Another challenge involved in consolidating the budget was reliance on distortionary indirect 
taxes for revenue. Tariffs, for instance, remained stubbornly high, ranking lower than only 
Nigeria in the 2001 GCR, because they served as a crutch for the budget. A shift to a more direct 
tax regime, and especially a VAT, was desired in order to reduce these distortions. Yet a national 
VAT, at this time, was not possible under the federalized tax authority operating within India in 
which states and the central government were responsible for enforcing different portions of the 
tax code. To accommodate this, India first introduced a Modified VAT (MODVAT) in 1986 
which credited duties on imported inputs and capital goods which went towards the manufacture 
of domestic products. Doing so rationalized levies applied to imports and domestic products, 
serving as an operational, if complicated, VAT. By 1999, discussions had begun regarding 
simplification and replacement of MODVAT with a uniform Goods & Services Tas (GST), and a 
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government commission recommended rolling out GST in 2005. However, action on this would 
not take place for another twelve years. In the meantime, to broaden the tax base and improve 
compliance, personal income taxes were reduced from a top rate of 56% to a top rate of 30%, 
and corporate taxes fell from 57.5% as of 1991-92 to 35% in 2001. These moves were, in fact, so 
successful at improving compliance that personal and corporate tax revenues actually increased 
as a percentage of GDP despite the reductions in rates. 
 
The external sector reforms which had been put in place during the first wave of reforms began 
to show real results during this period. The gradual liberalization of trade, as opposed to a shock 
therapyesque loosening of all restrictions within a short period, allowed domestic companies to 
adjust to the presence of external competition, and to eventually thrive against it. During the 
1990s, merchandise exports rose nearly 250% to 44.8 billion USD, and while non-oil imports 
doubled to 43.6 billion USD over the same period, the current account deficit still remained at 
<1% GDP. One of the primary enablers of these newly liberalized trade policy was the new 
exchange rate policy which combined responsiveness to market conditions with a minimal level 
of intervention to cushion volatility. The remittances which flowed into India as a response to the 
new currency policy helped reduce the country’s external debt from 38.7% in March 1992 to 
21% in September 2001. Thanks in part to this decline in external debt, the debt service to 
revenues ratio dropped from 35.3% to 17.1% over the decade, and short-term debt fell from 
10.2% to 3.5% of total debt. 
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External and sectoral reforms led to significant increases in domestic and foreign investment, leading to high rates 
of growth. The investment share of GDP has since moderated as these reforms have failed to keep pace with the 
needs of investors, although low oil prices have helped support GDP by elevating consumption. Data: World Bank 
 
With encouragement of FDI and the opening of the Indian market to FIIs, foreign investment of 
all types skyrocketed. Portfolio investment was the main factor behind an increase in total 
foreign investment from 103 million USD in 1990-91 to 5 billion USD in 2000-01, but a total of 
56.2 billion USD in FDI was also approved over the decade, compared to a mere one billion 
USD in the 1980s. FDI was spurred on to this degree by a new accelerated process which offered 
a window of automatic approval for potential projects, helping avoid approval delays caused by 
red tape, and with foreign investment came technology, marketing, and management resources to 
India’s most urbanized and fastest-growing states. However, despite this newly streamlined 
approval procedure, opaque sectoral policies and bidding procedures, among other factors, 
prevented nearly 70% of approved FDI from materializing as actual investments.  
 
Poor sectoral competitiveness remained a significant barrier to new FDI, abetted by an enduring 
set of byzantine restrictions. One of these, the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, did not permit 
any firms with more than 100 workers to lay off any employees without explicit and rarely 
granted permission from the local government. Another law required firms to receive 
government permission to shut down, which ironically served as a barrier to entry for 
entrepreneurs who were unsure they could legally exit an industry once they had opened a 
business. Yet another regulation restricted competition by reserving specific sectors for cottage 
industry production and prohibiting the entry of large firms or the expansion of small firms 
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beyond a certain size, at the expense of efficiency and consumer welfare. These laws hindered 
formal private sector hiring by large and expanding companies to such a degree that between 
1978 and 2000, a period when China’s formal sector employment had increased from 95 million 
to 158.5 million, India’s had only increased from 22.9 million to 27.9 million. Moreover, 19.3 
million of these workers were in the public sector, leaving 8.6 million formally employed private 
sector workers in a country of over a billion. Repeal of the Industrial Disputes Act has been hotly 
debated over the decades, but there has there been no change to raise the law’s employment cap 
of 100 workers. 
 
Specific sectoral policy reforms, such as the abolition of licensing for investment by “large 
houses,” did boost certain industries. Software and services exports stemming from these reforms 
drove the technology industry, for instance, to grow by 42.4% annually between 1995 and 2000, 
which we know today as the start of the outsourcing and IT-enabled services boom. But on the 
whole, competitiveness was held back by a top-heavy and nonproductive group of public-sector 
firms which remained strikingly resistant to lasting reforms. For many of these firms, their cash 
value exceeded the present value of their dismal profits, limited by poor productivity, 
overmanning, excessive salaries, and poor overall management. Rather than closing these loss-
making firms and selling off their assets, which would have yielded budget by reducing interest 
payments on the deficit beyond the profits these companies were capable of bringing in, the 
government examined reviving them on a case-by-case basis. In practice, when any decision to 
close a public firm would immediately be challenged by labor unions in the courts, this slow 
approach was tantamount to complacency. 
 
India did make progress in reforming its public sector, which shrank as a share of GDP, capital 
investment, and final consumption expenditure over the decade and a half of reforms. Industries 
which had once been entirely reserved for the public sector, such as steel, heavy machinery, and 
power generation, had been opened to the private sector by 2002, leaving only sectors such as 
arms and ammunition, atomic energy, and railway transport under the exclusive license of 
public-sector companies. Yet the government still retained ownership of 240 enterprises, 27 
banks, and two large insurance companies in that year, demonstrating just how much progress 
remained. The sum weight of these firms amounted to a series of state monopolies in sectors 
where the state had no intrinsic comparative advantage which prevented competition and 
productivity improvements while dragging down the nation’s fiscal health. 
 
The durability of public-sector management in the financial sector is perhaps the most prominent 
example of failure to privatize certain industries held back growth, and is certainly the sector 
whose public-sector firms contributed the most to future economic difficulties. The late 1990s 
and early 2000s was a time of fertile innovation in the financial sector, exemplified by new 
trading technologies, new market instruments, and the establishment of nearly two dozen stock 
exchanges within India by the year 2002. Yet public-sector banks remained turgid and rife with 
mismanagement. PSBs faced limitations on recruitment and salary payment imposed by 
bureaucratic procedure which private banks simply did not face, and their decision making was 
impaired by political considerations. Such considerations also disincentivized public 
disinvestment from the sector, exemplified by the government’s failure to adopt the Committee 
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on Banking Sector Reform’s recommendation to reduce the government equity holding in 
public-sector banks to 33%. 
 
Power generation and distribution was another prominent example of where public-sector 
enterprises had failed to deliver needed results. Electricity was largely generated and distributed 
under a group of State Electricity Boards (SEBs), which set rates so low that they often failed 
even to recover their own costs. Political incentives linked to the public nature of the SEBs had 
prevented them from selling power at the rates necessary to purchase generating capacity 
efficiently and to make their own investments. At the same time, the state governments in charge 
of the SEBs were so financially burdened by the hidden subsidies inherent in charging such a 
low rate for power that they could not afford to invest in genuine development or poverty 
alleviation programs. In their place, they had a distortionary and regressive benefit which not 
only helped those who needed the least help the most, but could not muster the resources to meet 
the needs of their most disadvantaged citizens. 
 
Overall, by the early 2000s, India had made progress from its early 1990s nadir, but the sum of 
its institutions and economic policies continued to inhibit medium to long-term economic growth 
compared to the rest of the world. Continued high average tariffs, unpredictable revenue 
collection, persistent red tape, distortive subsidies, the high fiscal deficit and confining labor and 
enterprise regulations collectively held back the competitiveness and productivity of Indian 
industries, even if progress had been made on all these fronts. Soft and hard infrastructure 
continued to be found wanting, whether it related to financial infrastructure and the embryonic 
venture capital scene, a weak civil governance infrastructure which enabled rampant tax evasion 
and politicization of everyday government functions, or the very real lack of telecommunications 
infrastructure, roads, and port facilities.  
 
Moving forward, Indian reformers would have to face up to the vestigial explicit and implicit 
protectionism holding back their economy. Subsidies which propped up noncompetitive legacy 
industries would have to be dismantled. Inefficient state-owned enterprises would have to be 
broken up and sold off. The system of indirect taxation would have to be replaced with a 
consistently and fairly applied system of direct taxation. Expenditures on preferential programs 
and administrative bloat would have to be replaced by meaningful and intersectorally-minded 
investments in development. And the archaic edifice of labor laws would have to be torn down 
and replaced by a new set of rules which enabled flexible formal employment, free entry and exit 
regardless of the industry, and a symbiosis between the worlds of business and academia which 
could reliably mobilize India’s vast pool of skilled STEM personnel as scientists, entrepreneurs, 
engineers, and educators who could contribute to a rapidly advancing and changing economy.   
 
India’s Economy Outgrows its Governing Institutions 
 
The new millennium was somewhat of a golden age for Indian development efforts. The country 
grew at an average rate of 8% from 2002-2012, an impressive rate in before accounting for the 
impact of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and making India one of the world’s most 
impressive performers over this time period. This growth produced significant benefits for the 
population, whose per-capita income grew by 64% over the same period. Backed by the strong 
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economic growth resulting from the continued opening of the economy, India introduced some 
of the most comprehensive national investments in development in its history between 2000 and 
2010. Programs such as the Village Road Scheme, the Swajaldhara drinking water scheme, the 
Education For All Campaign, the National Rural Health Mission, the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen 
Vidyutikaran Yojana rural electrification scheme, and the Bharat Nirman rural infrastructure 
scheme promised an India where the provision of basic needs would never be put into question. 
 
The reforms of the past decade and a half had arguably made these programs possible by 
boosting the economy and governance institutions to a point where they could feasibly be 
imagined and implemented. But behind the scenes, the same sectoral inefficiencies and 
institutional shortcomings conspired to limit their success. Programs were underfunded and 
diminished by lack of oversight, accountability, and proficient management, particularly 
suffering from the exclusion of the local Panchayati Raj councils from their conception, design 
and execution. This weakened their impact in the rural communities which needed them most. 
With the disconnection of government resources from local knowledge, the atmosphere became 
ripe for corruption and misuse of funds, more so because local populations lacked any direct 
means to hold their government accountable for the outcomes of these programs. 
 
In fact, the missteps which plagued these early development initiatives were symptomatic of 
India’s larger unfinished reform agenda. India had grown to a point where economically, it was 
discussed as a superpower in waiting, and institutionally, it was capable of undertaking programs 
of the great ambition that these represented. But the institutions responsible for allotting 
resources to these vast enterprises, whether financial, governing or sectoral, remained too 
immature to distribute them quickly and efficiently. Excess demand and shortage of supply is a 
bottleneck by definition, and bottlenecks create pressures that lead to the prevalence of informal 
arrangements over the rule of law, and inevitably, corruption. 
 
The Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition in power under Manmohan Singh 
first from 2004-2009, then for a second term from 2009-2014, was indeed plagued by a series of 
corruption scandals which ultimately paved the way for the rise of the Modi government. If this 
sudden rise in corruption was caused by the failure to maintain a sufficient institutional 
framework to underpin growth, then one of the causes of the party’s downfall was its failure to 
continue carrying out India’s reform agenda. Having lost the once bipartisan consensus around 
reform within their coalition, the UPA government did not pursue reforms to the same magnitude 
as prior governments had for the preceding 13 years. Over the course of their time in office, this 
amounted to a decade of growth, during which India’s GDP more than doubled from 700 billion 
USD to 2 trillion USD, without a matching and equally necessary record of reforms to keep pace 
with this growth. The high rates of investments which took place under this government, 
completed under the framework of existing reforms, did lead to the strong growth India 
subsequently experienced. Yet the pressures they placed on resources such as land, minerals, 
energy, and bandwidth overwhelmed public and private systems for efficient resource allocation. 
Ironically for a government which had prioritized inclusive growth so heavily within its major 
initiatives, inclusive implementation of these ambitious initiatives had been made impossible by 
the failure of private and public governance institutions to run at the required capacity.  
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In the face of mass street protests against the corruption which had become increasingly 
apparent, the government chose to introduce populist measures in the face of mass protests to 
shore up their popularity instead of undertaking difficult, but necessary reforms to target the 
deficiencies at the root of this corruption. And where certain reforms had attained a fragile 
consensus within the coalition, they were stymied once the protests drained the government of 
the rest of its political capital. Furthermore, with the end of the first round of Quantitative Easing 
in the United States, external macroeconomic conditions became less favorable as India, now 
perceived as an unstable environment for investment, experienced capital flight, creeping 
inflation, and a weakening currency. The old demons had returned, and to make matters worse, 
the corruption scandals had created a secondary contraction in the economy as bureaucrats and 
bankers, fearing investigation, became risk averse to the point of refusing to perform routine 
tasks or issue routine loans. By 2014, the UPA coalition had lost the national elections to 
Narendra Modi’s BJP, their long and successful record of economic expansion in the face of 
challenging global conditions belied by the slow growth, inflation, high fiscal deficits and low 
popularity that faced them when they left office. 
 
Modi swept into office on a mandate to fight corruption, but the corruption the new government 
faced was not the doing of a few bad apples, but rather the predictable result of a reform agenda 
which had gone neglected for too long. The new government would have to balance a sectoral 
agenda to boost productivity with a development agenda to continue the work of lifting hundreds 
of millions of people out of poverty. In the agriculture space, it would struggle to encourage 
industrialization in the face of a price crisis where inefficient markets, policy distortions, low 
productivity and chronic national underinvestment in agricultural R&D relative to other 
countries had left many farmers unable even to support themselves. The manufacturing sector, 
now lagging far behind India’s neighbors, would have to be revitalized through continued labor 
and capital reforms along with a wholesale rethinking of tax and regulatory strategy within 
India’s Special Economic Zones. National-level infrastructure for transport, energy and water 
distribution would have to be built to meet the needs of an economy whose infrastructure 
requirements had long gone unmet, while in environments from the largest cities to the smallest 
hamlets, India would have to face the challenge of sustainable development during an age of 
accelerating urbanization, rapid technological change and social upheaval, and climate change. 
Causes and Effects of Current Economic Slowdown 
 
Today, once again, India is experiencing a slowdown. In 3Q 2019, annualized GDP growth had 
slowed to only 4.5%, compared to 7% earlier in Modi’s term as Prime Minister. Additionally, 
research by Arvind Subramanian has demonstrated that this growth rate is an overly optimistic 
assessment of India’s actual economic conditions, given what other indicators are showing. 
Figures such as investment, exports, imports, credit, and direct tax revenues flatlined relative to 
2011, even during years when GDP growth stayed relatively constant thanks, in part, to a 
temporary boost in consumption from low oil prices. In fact, outside of GDP growth, ancillary 
indicators of the health of India’s economy resemble nothing so much as the situation on the eve 
of the 1991-92 crisis. Consumer goods production growth has fallen from 4% in 2018-19 to only 
1% in 2019-20. Electricity generation growth is at a mere 1.8%, its lowest rate in 30 years. And 
non-GST tax revenues have stagnated, in contrast with the 10% growth experienced in 2018-19. 
CSD Working Paper Series: Towards a New Indian Model of Information and Communications 




Meanwhile, investment is trending down, consumption is slowing, and exports are once again 
shrinking as a proportion of GDP. What is hitting the economy so hard, why is this incipient 
crisis reflected in some of the data but not the rest, and what policy steps can be taken to right the 
ship before matters become worse?  
 
The current slowdown can trace its immediate causes to a series of financial crises taking place within a stressed 
post-demonetization, post-GST environment. However, its underlying roots go back to a failure to introduce 
adequate policy to promote investment, especially in manufacturing, through land, labor, capital, and regulatory 
reform. Data: FRED 
 
In fact, the present crisis is fundamentally different from the 1991-92 crisis in two ways. First, it 
is afflicting the real sector. India’s macroeconomic fundamentals have remained solid, foreign 
reserves continue to be robust, and there is no serious risk of inflation, devaluation or a debt 
crisis. Rather than a macroeconomic breakdown, the current state of affairs has revealed a 
microeconomic breakdown in key sectors across the economy. In the corporate sector, 
companies face a potential debt trap in which they pay more in bank interest than their earnings. 
Locked in a cycle in which interest, now at an average rate of 10.5%, outstrips nominal growth, 
at 6.1%, these companies have experienced steep rises in corporate stress. Low agricultural 
prices have reduced farmer earnings, while climate conditions, poorly designed policy 
incentives, and insufficient R&D in the agriculture sector have conspired to depress agricultural 
productivity and overall incomes. And rural, commercial, and urban consumption demand, as 
measured by automobile sales for two-wheelers, trucks, and cars respectively, has contracted 
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Inflation largely trended down over Modi’s first term in rural and urban areas alike, indicating a discipline on the 
part of RBI which was lacking in earlier crises. Data: RBI 
 
Given how open India’s economy has become relative to the last major crises it faced, it is 
tempting to pin the sudden and apparently inexplicable slowdown on external factors, such as 
conditions in the world market unfavorable to Indian exports. But Indian exports have performed 
relatively better than world exports, while global economic growth remains faster than it was 
prior to the most recent slowdown. Additionally, oil remains inexpensive and trade did not slow 
down significantly after this slowdown commenced. It is more likely that after experiencing a 
period of unnaturally high consumption, India is regressing to the natural long-term growth rate 
which its governing and sectoral institutions permit. Moving past this growth rate, and 
particularly boosting manufacturing from its anemic current state, will require a return to the 




   
GDP and Employment Impact of Demonetization 
 
The present slowdown may by a return to India’s natural rate of growth, rather than a significant 
underperforming of its fundamentals, but two direct policy missteps helped spark the economic 
slide. The first, and most obvious, was the spontaneous decision to demonetize 87.5% of the 
nation’s currency without substantial preparation or adequate printing of replacement currency. 
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Over the next 3-4 months of remonetization, banks saw lines out the door, poor families feared 
the possibility of losing their savings, and the informal sector, whose economic activity is often 
not fully accounted in GDP calculations, lacked the hard currency it needed to exchange for 
transactions. None were hit harder than poor entrepreneurs, especially in rural areas. 
 
Demonetization did not only impact the informal sector. Real estate, another cash-heavy sector 
which had already been weakened by a series of financial crises, was also strongly affected, 
impacting the financial health of developers and eventually the NBFCs they relied on for 
financing. Overall, demonetization is estimated to have cost up to 2.3% annual GDP growth in 
measurable sectors of the economy alone, let alone the informal sector, while substantially 
increasing unemployment. Nor did demonetization substantially reduce black money, as was its 
goal, and while some argued that demonetization produced a long-term benefit for the economy 
by jumpstarting e-payment systems and formalization in the economy, others such as Raghuram 
Rajan have argued that demonetization itself did not have a lasting impact on these factors.  
  
Implementation Challenges of GST 
 
The Goods and Services Tax (GST) was a long-proposed reform, pursued by both major political 
coalitions and finally passed into law in July 2017. By replacing and simplifying the complicated 
set of indirect taxes which the government had long relied on for revenue, including excise 
duties, the services tax, customs duties, surcharges and MODVAT, the GST stands to streamline 
the revenue collection process, cut down on administrative expenses, increase rates of 
compliance, and ultimately spur growth in the economy by making exports more competitive. 
However, following the passage of the constitutional amendment which put GST into practice, 
insufficient preparation was undertaken to smoothly roll out the new tax. Computers were not set 
up to handle the new volume of transactions, submission forms were unnecessarily complicated, 
and rates were frequently and unpredictably adjusted. To make matters worse, this resulting 
unexpected uncertainty emerged just as the economy had started rebounding from 
demonetization, prolonging the national economic shock. 
 
Given the timing, observers, especially among the political opposition, are often tempted to 
blame the recent slowdown on the introduction of the GST itself. These observers frequently 
point to how GST revenues have fallen since its introduction, suggesting that the tax suffers from 
some fundamental flaw. And uncertainty about how GST would ultimately be implemented 
certainly did result in a temporary slowdown as households decided to postpone consumption 
and major purchases until the policy had become settled. But GST revenues fell because the 
whole economy has started to slowdown, and blaming GST itself for the contraction deflects 
attention from the accumulated reform deficit which is at the root of India’s economic challenges 
today. 
 
Accumulating Need for Reforms 
 
Outside of GST and the passage of a modern law to replace the creaking and ineffectual 
bankruptcy mechanism, no significant reforms have taken place to propel economic growth in 
India since 2004. At the opening of Modi’s first term, and following the corruption scandals of 
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the second UPA government, the new government prioritized anticorruption measures at the 
sectoral, household and macroeconomic level. But while these targeted the symptoms of 
corruption, they failed to target the need for structural reforms which had caused corruption to 
spread in the first place. Modest economic advances have taken place – for example, inflation 
declined from nearly 10% in 2013-14 to 3-4% in 2018-19 once RBI was given free reign to 
control it. Technological advances backed by the government such as the cutting-edge UPI retail 
payments system have improved commercial efficiency and transparency. But on the whole, 
investment has not revived, reducing potential long-term growth, and sectoral reforms have not 
addressed underlying sources of stress undermining both competitiveness and profitability.   
 
 
Despite reforms meant to promote it, the manufacturing sector has consistently lagged behind agriculture and 
services in percentage contributed to GDP. Agriculture lacks significant growth potential, but manufacturing is 
likely to be a key driver of the next Indian growth boom, playing the same role as the services sector in the 1990s 
and 2000s. Data: World Bank 
 
Investment in the Indian economy has fallen steadily since the financial crisis. Current investors 
remain too stressed by existing debt to start new projects, while banks remain unwilling to make 
new loans for manufacturing and infrastructure projects. As a result, collectively, investment as a 
percentage of GDP over the period 2016-2018 has fallen to its lowest point since 2003. The low 
demand, slow earnings growth, and difficulty servicing debt fostered by these economic 
conditions has caused India’s ratio of corporate credit upgrades to downgrades to fall to .80, 
itself a six-year low. 
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Non-Performing Assets and the “Twin Balance Sheet” Crisis 
 
The corporate debt which has grown to such dangerously high levels today was seeded during 
India’s boom years of rapid growth from 2004-2010, when public-sector banks began lending to 
infrastructure companies and NBFCs, or “shadow banks,” on a basis which was not always 
competitive. These arrangements often led to banks holding the debt of risky and deeply 
unprofitable companies. During times of economic plenty, these banks were able to conceal the 
impact of these Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) on their books. But the accumulated bad debt 
owed by these infrastructure companies could no longer be concealed once the economy cooled 
down and once reported NPAs of public sector banks rose as high as 14% of gross advances. In 
their attempts to continue concealing these bad assets, PSBs “evergreened” their bad assets, 
entrenching the problem and giving this bad debt opportunities to infect other areas of the 
economy. It was only once RBI ordered banks to undergo asset review that the true scope of the 
NPA problem emerged. As a result of the NPA crisis, all public sector lending has slowed 
significantly. With problems recovering costs for outstanding loans, these banks have become 
significantly more reluctant to issue any new loans, regardless of the borrower. Because NPAs 
have put such a chill on lending, resolution of these bad debts is a prerequisite to restarting the 
entire lending engine. The Modi government has applied the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Act, 
passed in 2016, in an attempt to force borrowers to repay lenders in order to solve this problem. 
Like prior legislative attempts, this worked at first, but the law weakened once loopholes were 
discovered and exploited through the judiciary. 
 
 
Disclosed NPAs in public-sector banking rapidly increased once RBI introduced asset review to identify and contain 
them. In contrast, private-sector banks have kept NPAs well under control, benefiting from stricter due diligence, 
better management, and lack of pressure to fulfill unfunded lending mandates. Data: RBI 
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In the meantime, private banks and NBFCs have attempted to fill the gap left behind, but not 
without encountering challenges of their own. While private banks have been careful to complete 
due diligence while issuing loans, NBFCs lent to developers predominantly operating in the 
retail sector. With the economic slowdown, these developers have encountered trouble, which 
rebounded back on the NBFCs. Already a more inherently risky lender than normal banks 
because they don’t accept money from depositors, NBFCs put themselves in an even more 
precarious position by financing unsold inventory with their excessive lending to real estate 
companies, or feeding a “non-bubble bubble.” By 2019, out of ten lakh crore INR in housing 
value on the market, only two lakh crore INR would be sold. 
 
The underlying vulnerability of the unsustainable lending in which NBFCs had taken part in was 
perhaps best exemplified by the collapse of Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services 
(IL&FS), a major NBFC which had engaged with developers like so many others. The collapse 
of the IL&FS loan bubble in September 2018 was the peak of an NBFC crisis which revealed the 
overarching fragility of the sector, creating a high perception of risk and chilling lending there as 
well. After IL&FS, commercial housing loans, which had primarily been managed by NBFCs, 
dropped from 22 lakh crore INR in 2018-19 to a mere one lakh crore INR in 2019-20 to date. 
 
The NBFC balance sheet crisis was ultimately so serious because it made it difficult for NBFCs 
to access credit precisely at the moment when bad loans had built up for them and they most 
needed it. Yet it was only the latest in a series of bank collapses and financial scandals, such as 
those involving Punjab & Maharashtra Co-op Bank, Punjab National Bank, and DHFL.A full 3.5 
lakh crore INR of public funding, or nearly 49 billion USD, has gone toward propping up public 
sector banks in just the past five years, to the tune of much public anger. Public attempts at 
enforcing liability through prosecution have in a way backfired, further chilling lending by 
institutions which feared collateral damage from the heavy and ultimately counterproductive 
hand of arbitrary prosecution. 
 
Even with a wounded bank sector, high rates of household savings could give these banks the 
liquidity they need to pull out of their nosedive. After all, Asian economies have historically 
grown on the strength of well-invested private savings, and India’s own recent economic history 
has demonstrated that with high savings and investment comes higher growth. But the opposite 
seems to have occurred. India’s household savings rate has declined from 24% in 2012 to 17% in 
2018, while household debt has increased from a low of 8.6% of nominal GDP in 2012 to 11.6% 
in 1Q 2019. While the debt level remains low, the rapid increase in household borrowing is a 
cause for concern, especially when paired with falling levels of savings. 
 
Declining Export Growth and Special Economic Zones 
 
With the slowdown, India’s economy has also gradually started closing to the outside world. 
Import growth has reached its lowest point in 30 years, contracting at 6%, and imports of capital 
goods have contracted even more by 10%. This has taken place despite substantially stronger 
GDP growth now compared to in 1991-92. While exports were never a strong source of growth, 
the GDP share of exports is now shrinking rather than growing, as exports have started growing 
more slowly than overall GDP. Compared to the double-digit growth non-oil exports, a strong 
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indicator of the health of the real economy, experienced in the 1990s and 2000s, non-oil exports 
this year instead fell by 1%. While various recent reforms have tried to replicate the export 
promotion success of early efforts, they have, for the most part, failed. Among these, the Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) India began setting up in the early 2000s have become particularly 
symbolic of this failure.  
 
Starting in 1965 with the establishment of the Kandla Free Trade Zone, India had, like many 
other countries, established Export Processing Zones (EPZs) to encourage the opening of the 
economy by targeting tax holidays and other incentives towards export goods produced within 
certain geographic regions. However, Indian EPZs experienced limited success because they 
lacked proper administrative control to create a beneficial policy environment, had insufficient 
infrastructure to accumulate a comparative manufacturing advantage, and lacked both the 
authority and the scope to introduce concessions that would serve as adequate incentives for 
businesses. The project had largely been abandoned until the world started taking note of the 
success of China’s SEZs in establishing export promotion and manufacturing clusters which 
were powering that country’s growth. Wanting to replicate this success, the Indian government 
recast its existing EPZs as SEZs starting in 2000 and put forth new incentives to attract 
manufacturing within these zones. 
 
The new SEZs did have more policy authority than in their former incarnation as EPZs. To boost 
global competitiveness, SEZs permitted Overseas Banking Units (OBUs) which provided firms 
operating within them market simplified access to international finance by operating as Indian 
banks exempt from normal RBI regulations. But the successes of Indian SEZs were greatly 
outnumbered by their missteps. Far too many SEZs were established, and they were designated 
with little regard for the benefits of geography. India today has 373 SEZs, up from 221 in 2017, 
covering less than one square mile on average. These zones are too small to amass a critical mass 
of industry which can produce the clustering effects which power the most successful 
manufacturing districts. In addition, many of them are in landlocked states, in areas entirely 
unsuitable for shipping exports for the foreign market. China, in comparison, only has five 
normally-designated SEZs, but they cover entire metropolitan areas, averaging nearly 60 square 
miles in size. The Chinese SEZs are located along China’s highly industrialized coast, tapping 
into shipping routes to manufacture goods for all points along international supply chains. 
 
Other challenges faced by Indian SEZs involve the way in which they fail to take advantage of 
their special legal status in order to make the most of the four factors of production that go into 
manufacturing, namely land, labor, capital, and business environment. Much SEZ land is 
earmarked not for development in manufacturing or the services industry, but for residential and 
commercial properties – a perfectly fine use of land, but one which wastes the advantaged legal 
status of SEZs while preventing the industrial clustering they are meant to encourage. Unlike 
Chinese SEZs, which feature independent and liberal hiring, firing, and exit policies, Indian 
SEZs are subject to the relevant labor and industrial laws of their host states. This makes them 
overwhelmingly subject to anti-competitive rules such as the Industrial Disputes Act, restrictions 
on the entry of large firms in specific industries, and restrictions on firm exit from certain 
markets. To date, Indian SEZs have only received piecemeal exceptions from these rules. 
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Rising consumption and a lagging domestic manufacturing sector has led to increased demand for imports and a 
relatively high trade deficit. Export promotion efforts have largely failed to this point, necessitating a holistic review 
of SEZ policy. Data: World Bank 
 
India’s export challenges, of course, go beyond the shortcomings of SEZs, touching on an 
overarching lack of hard and soft infrastructure. For instance, until the establishment of the 
Vallarpadom terminal in Kochi in 2012, India was entirely lacking in port facilities equipped to 
handle transshipment. This left 60% of India’s exports and imports to be shipped through foreign 
ports in Sri Lanka, Singapore and other nearby countries, at the cost of additional expenses and 
up to an additional week of transit time. More properly thought-out SEZs, however, would have 
not only provided the demand to build these domestic facilities earlier and in a geographically 
advantageous position, but could also have taken advantage of a more comprehensively export-
oriented legal framework to develop industrial parks for exports, build the necessary 
infrastructure for export through more liberal land acquisition rules, and mobilize a fluid pool of 
skilled labor to fill the rapidly changing needs of the global market. 
   
High Deficits and Reduced Fiscal Space 
 
High fiscal deficits continue to limit the government’s policy responses to a potential recession, 
and are in fact higher than official data indicates. Hidden expenditures such as food subsidies 
hide the true budget deficit. Whereas the official budget deficit is 3.5% for the central 
government, and 8.5% including state governments, JP Morgan estimates the actual combined 
fiscal deficit to go as high as 9-10% of GDP. The official figures conceal not only hidden 
expenditures, but excessively optimistic revenue projections following the recent corporate tax 
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cut; off-balance borrowing by public institutions; and various accounting tricks, such as 
accelerating revenues and deferring liabilities. 
 
The bill for these maneuvers is now starting to come due. Borrowing by the Food Corporation of 
India, India’s main agricultural market price regulator, rose from under .7% of GDP in 2015-16 
to over 1.1% of GDP in 2017-18. Off-balance borrowing by the National Highway Authority of 
India (NHAI) similarly rose from .2% GDP in 2014-15 to .7% GDP in 2017-18. At the state 
level, programs that drive these hidden deficits, such as agricultural loan forgiveness programs, 
aren’t just sources of fiscal stress. They also disproportionately benefit the wealthy which have 
access to formal financial structures, since the poor often rely on moneylenders operating outside 
the formal financial system. Debt relief, therefore, makes debt public without assisting the 
poorest farmers at the heart of India’s ongoing agricultural crisis, reducing fiscal space for 
programs which could actually benefit them. 
 
With banks in need of recapitalization, NBFCs burdened by bad loans, and expansive social 
programs such as Ayushman Bharat whose fiscal impact has not yet been determined, contingent 
liabilities will continue to rise in a way which cannot be cleanly accounted for in current budgets, 
but will greatly impact future budgets. This means that while public stimulus is desirable in a 
contractionary environment, the government must remain mindful of the unknown and evolving 
fiscal impact of these existing liabilities. Stimulus via income tax cuts, which would only target 
spending and consumption for the wealthiest ten percent of the population, would fail the test of 
inclusivity necessary in a stimulus program. Nor should the government turn to monetary policy 
to inflate away its deficit after spending the past 30 years meticulously building up the credibility 




Non-Performing Assets in Public-Sector Banking 
 
Public-sector banks are in desperate need of improved governance in order to function well 
without taking on excessively risky liabilities, but current attempts have stalled. The Modi 
government has created the Bank Board Bureau to make recommendations, but the body lacks 
power and independence. Likewise, the boards of public sector banks have become politicized 
due to lack of independence in their composition. To its credit, the government has attempted to 
improve the functionality of these banks by consolidating them according to the IT they use, the 
regions they serve, and the services they provide. But this low-hanging fruit has consumed 
management energy that was more needed to enforce reform from the top down and deal with 
more basic stresses such as the slowing economy and rising NPAs. Without addressing the basic 
causes of financial stress in these public-sector banks, these mergers have been more cosmetic 
than practical. 
 
Public-sector banks have also been hamstrung by political pressure to fulfill a social mission, 
defined by often unfunded government mandates. For instance, the current government made 
MSME lending a major priority through the Mudra program, launched April 2015. But without 
furnishing sufficient resources for public-sector banks to follow standard procedures when taking 
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on so many new clients, the program rapidly ran into problems which have been brushed under 
the table. More informally, banks have been pressured into “loan fairs” which, while temporarily 
expanding access to capital for otherwise underserved groups, have worsened the NPA problem 
by encouraging lending without necessary due diligence. At the level of bank compensation 
structures, the conflict between the social and business missions of these firms creates staffing 
problems when low-level staff are paid above market wages and high-level staff are paid below 
market wages to compensate. This pushes away top management talent and exacerbates the 
governance problem in public-sector banking which has created so much sectoral turmoil. 
 
Business Environment Reforms 
 
Because high investment is a prerequisite for economic growth, and investment increases when 
firms plan to enter new markets or expand, improved practices and regulations regarding ease of 
doing business that lower barriers to productive investment is a necessary first step to increasing 
growth across the board. One of the major factors holding back FDI, which has flatlined since 
2015-16 at 40 billion USD at best, has been the failure to continue pursuing meaningful reforms 
to improve the business environment. 
 
Rather than meaningfully analyzing why businesses struggle and taking steps to simplify 
investment, India’s approach to improving the business environment has been a textbook 
example of Goodhart’s Law, or the idea that metrics which become targets cease to be useful 
metrics. In this case, the World Bank has published an Ease of Doing Business index since 2013. 
The Doing Business report grew from an attempt to quantitatively compare business 
environments between countries, an inherently flawed effort thanks to the great diversity of 
exogenous economic and cultural factors in every country measured. Regardless, the index has 
become enormously influential despite its unavoidable reliance on tracking the health of a 
business environment by its symptoms.  
 
Since the inception of the index, India’s business environment reforms have been laser-focused 
on increasing its standing within the index. Between 2014 and 2019, India rose every single year 
on the ranking, going from 142nd place in 2014 to 63rd place in 2019. But despite this 
improvement, investors and officials such as M Damodaran, the former chair of SEBI, 
complained that rising rankings did not correlate with real improvements in the ease of doing 
business. When metrics are manipulated to attract business, rather than rising as a natural result 
of governance reforms, what investment does materialize is likely to struggle once it comes into 
contact with reality. 
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India has recently started lagging behind neighboring lower-middle income countries in the region in terms of fixed 
investment, potentially foretelling declining long-term competitiveness particularly in the manufacturing space. In 
order to attract foreign investment which could otherwise go to these countries, India will need to comprehensively 
invest in improving its business environment, most critically in infrastructure. Data: World Bank 
 
The downstream impacts of India’s business environment can be seen by examining the health of 
its export-oriented manufacturing industries relative to its neighbors. Some industry stories, such 
as increased cell phone assembly, have been apparent success stories, but upon further 
examination are shallower than they appear. In this case, assembly of previously imported 
electronic components adds minimal value compared to the rest of the supply chain, and gaining 
more value would require an improved business environment in the electronics manufacturing 
sector to make manufacture and even design of original components feasible and cost-
competitive. Others can be less easily explained away. For example, China’s share of textile 
exports has gradually fallen, and as an equally populous, industrializing country, India would 
seem perfectly suited to pick up the slack in this fairly low-tech industry. But rather than taking 
China’s position, India has been outpaced by smaller neighbors such as Bangladesh and 
Vietnam. Could business environment factors such as logistics, infrastructure, land and factory 
availability, and liberal access to a qualified labor force have contributed to this choice?  
 
Poor Overall Policy Predictability and Transparency 
 
Finally, the Indian business environment has been plagued by unpredictable policies, 
inefficiently organized markets, and poorly designed supports. In the agricultural sector, farmers 
are constantly undercut by a government habit of banning the export of commodities – most 
recently, onions in late 2019 – when prices go too high. This is intended to drive down prices for 
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which may already be struggling with profitability. Other industries are the beneficiaries of high 
tariffs, legacies of the import substitution regime in place before the 1990s, which keep Indian 
manufacturers from integrating with global supply chains requiring the import of intermediate 
goods. Reducing these tariffs would increase trade and incentivize investment, and even holding 
them steady would simplify investment decisions. But tariffs remain both high and fluctuating in 
politically influential sectors of the economy, depressing demand, scaring away investment and 
estranging India from those supply chains. India’s reputation for policy unpredictability has 
likewise prevented it from reaping the full benefits of the recent corporate tax cut, since investors 
have no assurances that the rate for the new manufacturing firms incorporated post October 2019 
will stay put at 15-17%. Absent a formal process to stabilize these taxes and tariffs, India will 
struggle to retain investment and will not be viewed as the reliable link in global supply chains it 
must be in order to revive the manufacturing sector. 
  
CSD Working Paper Series: Towards a New Indian Model of Information and Communications 






Aggarwal, Aradhna. “Export Processing Zones in India: Analysis of the Export Performance.” 
Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations: Working Paper No. 48. 
November 2004. 
Bajpai, Nirupam. “A Decade of Economic Reforms in India: The Unfinished Agenda.” Center 
for International Development at Harvard University: Working Paper No. 89. April 2002. 
Bajpai, Nirupam. “Economic Crisis, Structural Reforms and the Prospects of Growth in India.” 
Harvard Institute for International Development: Paper No. 294053. May 1996. 
Bajpai, Nirupam and Sachs, Jeffrey D. “India’s Decade of Development: Looking Back at the 
Last Ten Years and Looking Forward to the Next 20.” Columbia Global Centers: South Asia 
Working Paper No. 3. July 2011. 
Bajpai, Nirupam et al. “Post-Demonetization E-Payment Trends.” Earth Institute Center for 
Sustainable Development, Columbia University. ICT India Working Paper #1. September 2018. 
Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance. “An Economic and Functional 
Classification of the Central Government Budget, 2017-2018.” Government of India. November 
7, 2019. 
Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance. “Economic Survey 2019-20.” 
Government of India. January 2020. 
NITI Aayog. “ArthNITI Volume Three.” January 25, 2020. 
Press Trust of India. “Not sure if ease of doing business improved with India’s ranking: 
Damodran.” Business Standard. February 27, 2020. 
PTI New Delhi. “FinMin wants PSU Banks to bring down govt equity to 52%.” The Hindu 
Business Line. January 14, 2019. 
Rajan, Raghuram. “India’s Economy: How Did We Get Here and What Can be Done?” Lecture, 
Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University. October 16, 2019. 
Roy, Prannoy and Subramanian, Arvind. “Not Just Any Ordinary Economic Slowdown.” 
Interview, NDTV. December 25, 2019. 
TNN. “State SEZs to be out of Industrial Disputes Act.” The Economic Times. July 25, 2002. 
 
 
    
 
